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Abstract
We study bank discrimination against private ﬁrms in transition countries. Theo-
retically, we show that banks may discriminate for non-proﬁt reasons, but this discrim-
ination diminishes with a bank’s incentives and human capital. Employing matching
bank-ﬁrm data from China, we empirically examine the extent, sources and conse-
quences of discrimination. Our unique survey design allows us to disentangle sample
truncation, omitted variable bias, and endogeneity issues. Our empirical ﬁndings con-
ﬁrm the theoretical predictions. We also ﬁnd that as a result of discrimination, private
ﬁrmsresorttomoreexpensivetradecredits.
11 Introduction
The role of the banking sector in the process of economic transition is well recognized. Bank
behavior largely determines the hardness of the budget constraints facing enterprises, and
thus, ﬁrm incentives. Banks also play an important role in the intermediation of savings,
and the allocation of credit to existing and especially newly established ﬁrms. Indeed, it
is because of these links and the banking systems’ potential eﬀects on the real sector that
some observers have argued for the need for enterprise restructuring, privatization, and bank
reform to go hand-in-hand (Brainard, 1991).
Since the early 1990s, the private sector has been the most dynamic sector of the Chinese
economy. Between 1990 and 2000, the average annual growth rate of output in this sector
was almost 60 percent (China Statistical Yearbook; Zhang and Ming, 2001).1 This sector
includes not only de novo private ﬁrms, but also many State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and
especially Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) that were privatized since 1993 (Cao,
Qian and Weingast, 1999; Nyberg and Rozelle, 2001).2 By the end of 2000, the private sector
was producing more than one-third of China’s industry output.
Although the private sector is growing rapidly, borrowing from China’s state-owned com-
mercial banking sector by private ﬁrms remains meager.3 According to a recent World Bank
Report (2000), in the late 1990s the private sector received less than one percent of the total
lending of China’s commercial banks.4 Most investment and working capital are ﬁnanced
through retained earnings, informal networks, and inter-ﬁrm credit (Lardy, 1998; Zhang and
Ming, 2001). The sharp contrast between private sector growth and the loans the sector
receives from the banking system raises a fundamental question: Are private ﬁrms being
discriminated against in the formal ﬁnancial markets? If so, why?
1These numbers are slightly misleading because of the very low base from which they are calculated,
however, it remains the case that private ﬁrms grew rapidly over this period.
2In the 1980s, the TVE sector was the most rapidly growing segment of the economy.
3China’s banking sector is dominated by four state-owned banks, namely, the Bank of China, Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China. Rural
areas are also served by the Rural Credit Cooperatives, while the Urban Commercial Banks (formerly, the
Urban Credit Cooperatives) also service urban areas.
4These ﬁgures may underestimate the lending to the private sector, however, it is still the case that state
and collectively-owned ﬁrms are receiving a disproportionate share of the credit.
2This paper tackles the question of bank discrimination against private ﬁrms, drawing
on a unique matching bank-ﬁrm data set collected by the authors in rural China in 1998.
Bank behavior in China towards private ﬁrms has potentially important implications for the
ongoing privatization process, and economic growth, more generally (Brandt and Zhu, 2000
and 2002). It also has implications for ﬁnancial sector reform.
Our analysis makes several contributions to the literature on discrimination and transition
economies. First, this paper is one of the ﬁrst studies of ownership discrimination in the
formal loan market. Most of the existing literature looks at gender or racial discrimination.
Second, our data allow us to identify potential sources of discrimination, notably, bank
manager incentives and attributes. Although the banking system in China is undergoing
reform, heterogeneity at the local level in this process gives rise to signiﬁcant institutional
diﬀerences across localities, especially with respect to bank manager incentive systems. We
exploit these diﬀerences to help identify diﬀerences in bank lending behavior across ownership
groups. Third, our survey and sampling design allow us to deal with a number of common
econometric problems encountered in the literature on bank discrimination, notably, the role
of demand side eﬀects on lending behavior and an under-sampling of certain groups (here,
private ﬁrms). Finally, we use additional information on the ﬁrm’s entire debt structure to
investigate “market” discrimination of private ﬁrms as opposed to discrimination of these
ﬁrms by a single bank. As Becker (1957) and Heckman (1998) note, it is at the margin, i.e.
where ﬁrms actually borrow, that economic values are set.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy surveys the literature on bank
discrimination. Section 3 describes ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁrms in rural China. Section 4
builds a simple theoretical model that generates predictable hypothesis of ownership discrim-
ination. Section 5 introduces the survey and the data. Sections 6, 7 and 8 econometrically
examine the extent, consequences, and sources of discrimination. Section 9 concludes.
32 Literature Review
Three central issues dominate the discrimination literature. First, how do you deﬁne dis-
crimination? Second, what are its sources? And third, how do you empirically test for
it?
There are a number of alternative deﬁnitions of discrimination. On the one hand, there
is a strictly legal notion. The American civil rights law, for example, deﬁnes discrimination
as the unfavorable treatment of a person solely on the basis of that person’s membership in
a “protected class” (Yinger, 1998). There is also an analytical deﬁnition. Following Becker
(1993), discrimination in the market place consists of “voluntarily relinquishing proﬁts, wages
or income to cater to prejudice.” In this paper, we will draw largely on the analytical deﬁ-
nition.
These deﬁnitions entertain a number of alternative sources of discrimination. The ﬁrst
and most obvious source is simply discrimination by tastes (Arrow, 1998; Becker, 1957;
Yinger, 1998). Banks may discriminate against a certain group because they dislike the
applicants for cultural or historical reasons. In China, banks are state-owned, and may have
a purely ideological preference for lending to government-owned ﬁrms over private ﬁrms.
Lending to government-owned ﬁrms may also generate perks to banks that do not exist
when lending to private ﬁrms. More generally, banks may be willing to sacriﬁce proﬁts in
order to seek political, ideological or personal goals rather than the bank’s proﬁts. The lack
of competition in China’s banking system may help to sustain such behavior.
Second, diﬀerences in lending may arise because banks possess better information on a
certain group of loan applicants (Arrow, 1998; Fafchamps, 2000). When it is costly to acquire
information about an applicant’s true credit worthiness, banks may base their decisions on
group characteristics. This is the basis for statistical discrimination (Schwab, 1986; Arrow,
1998; Darity and Mason, 1998; Yinger, 1998). If the credit history of a certain group
is bad, then all members in that group will face discriminatory behavior. In China, banks
have been dealing almost exclusively with government-owned ﬁrms, and have developed good
channels for obtaining credit information about these ﬁrms. Newly established, private ﬁrms
4might ﬁnd themselves at a disadvantage in this regard, and individually face discriminatory
behavior by banks.
There are two other reasons why private ﬁrms may face diﬃculty in accessing formal
sector credit. In both of these cases, however, diﬀerential treatment of private ﬁrms by
banks might be defended on proﬁtability grounds. First, discrimination in other markets
can aﬀect bank-lending decisions. If a certain group is discriminated against in either the
input or product markets, then it is more likely for the loan applicants in this group to default.
Knowing there exists such discrimination, banks may decide not to lend to loan applicants
in this group (Ladd, 1998; Loury, 1998). In addition, banks may discriminate against private
ﬁrms because they are perceived as being riskier than government-owned ﬁrms, which pool
risks together (Park and Shen, 2002). In the event of default, the government can use either
ﬁscal resources or funds from other government-owned ﬁrms to repay a ﬁrm’s loan.
The empirical literature analyzing discrimination against minorities and women in the
mortgage and small business loan markets is directly related to the question we tackle. Em-
ploying OLS, Probit or Logit models of loan denial rates, Yinger (1986), Munnell (1996) and
Blanchﬂower et al. (1998) ﬁnd that the race (gender) dummies are signiﬁcantly positive,
which implies that women and minorities are less likely to get loans, all else equal. Inter-
preting these ﬁndings as “discrimination” is potentially problematic however. The main
concern is that these regressions may exclude variables that are important in the banks’
lending decisions, most notably, measures of credit worthiness. This omission gives rise to
omitted variable bias in the estimates of the eﬀect of race and gender (Neal and Johnson,
1996; Heckman, 1998; Darity and Mason, 1998; Yinger, 1998), and can lead the researchers
to conclude that groups are being discriminated against, when in fact they are not.
There are a number of methods for dealing with unobserved variable bias. The ﬁrst and
also the most direct method is simply to ﬁnd good measures for credit worthiness (Munnell
et al., 1996), and include them as additional controls in the regression. The second method
is to check to see if there is “equal treatment” for loan receivers (Blanchﬂower et al., 1998;
Ladd, 1998). If the study group has to pay a higher interest rate, or meet a higher loan
5standard, all else equal, then discrimination against this group can be inferred. The third
method is to examine if other creditors are also unwilling to provide loans to the study
group (Blanchﬂower et al., 1998). The fourth method is to compare the default rate of the
study group with that of the control group (Ladd, 1998). If a group of loan applicants is
discriminated against, then only the more credit-worthy applicants in the group should be
able to obtain bank loans. This suggests that the ex post loan performance of the study
group should be better than the control group.
Sample design issues, notably, the use of data on only loan applicants, introduce po-
tentially oﬀsetting biases (Heckman, 1998). Suppose there is a cost of a loan application,
which is the same for both groups. If individuals (ﬁrms) in the study group believe that
the probability of getting a loan is low, they may not be willing to incur the cost of the
application. If, as a result, many individuals (ﬁrms) in the study group decide not to apply,
using a sample of loan applicants will under-estimate the eﬀect of discrimination because
the only individuals (ﬁrms) in the study group that apply are those who are most likely to
get a loan. A solution to this problem is to obtain information on the demand for loans for
all ﬁrms, and not just those that applied for a loan.
Finally, Heckman (1998) argues that discrimination by a randomly selected party (a
bank in our case) does not necessarily imply market discrimination. A particular ﬁnancial
institution may not want to lend to a private ﬁrm, but if other ﬁnancial institutions are
willing to lend and on as good as terms, then discrimination is not an issue. What matters
is the behavior of the marginal lender or set of lenders. This suggests that we will want to
look at a ﬁrm’s access to all sources of credit, and their entire debt structure, and not just
that from banks.
3 Financial Institutions and Firms in Rural China
Two ﬁnancial institutions dominate the formal ﬁnancial system in rural China: The Agri-
cultural Bank of China (ABC), and the Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCC). As of the late
1990s, these two institutions held nearly eighty percent of all rural deposits, and were the
6source of an equal percentage of loans, nearly half of which went to local township and village
enterprises (Park, Giles and Brandt, 1997).
The ABC is one of the four specialized state-owned banks and historically was responsible
for lending to support agriculture and rural development. Branches are located in almost
every township in rural China.5 Oﬃcially, the RCCs are autonomous, collectively-run local
institutions, but up through the early 1990s were usually supervised by local ABC branches.
In some cases, the same individual managed the two institutions. However, in 1994 the
supervision of the RCCs shifted to China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC),
and the separation between the RCCs and ABCs became more distinct.
Township level branches of the ABC report to county level branches of the same bank;
RCCs, on the other hand, report to county-level RCC associations (xinyong lianshe). For
both ﬁnancial institutions, township branch managerial incentives, loan size limits, credit
quotas, etc. are set at the county level. ABC and RCC township managers are also appointed
by banking authorities at the county level, but in both cases, township-level governments
and party oﬃcials can exercise important inﬂuence over these decisions. Unlike the lending
to state-owned enterprises by state-owned banks, however, lending to township and village
enterprises was not administratively mandated as part of a credit plan.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, enterprises that were owned and managed by
township and village governments (TVEs) dominated China’s rural industrial sector (Che
and Qian, 1998; Chen and Rozelle, 1999). Beginning in 1993, local governments were given
permission to privatize these ﬁrms as part of a nationwide policy on enterprise ownership
restructuring, or zhuanzhi. Previously, privatization was strictly prohibited. Reﬂecting the
high degree of administrative decentralization in China, local governments were eﬀectively
given discretion as to how to interpret and carry out the new policy. By the end of the 1990s,
nearly two-thirds of all TVEs had been privatized in the provinces in which we surveyed,
though considerable diﬀerences exist across townships in the extent of privatization.
5The township (town) is the lowest level of government in China’s administrative hierarchy, with the
county immediately above.
74 The Model
In this section, we consider a stylized model of bank monitoring, which links bank discrim-
ination against private ﬁrms to non-proﬁt incentives. The model also generates testable
hypotheses: Discrimination diminishes with a bank manager’s incentives and human capi-
tal. Although we only model ex post monitoring and do not consider the role of ex ante bank
screening, we test empirically whether information is an important source of discrimination.
Consider a simple model of bank lending. Suppose that there are 2N ﬁrms in the economy,
half are Township Enterprises (TEs), and the other half are Private Enterprises (PEs).
Assume the N TEs are identical to the N PEs in all respects other than ownership. Each
ﬁrm has a project that requires an investment of 1 unit, which it ﬁnances in full by borrowing
from the bank at a ﬁxed (gross) interest rate r.
A ﬁrm’s project generates stochastic returns. If a project succeeds, it generates a payoﬀ
larger than r; and if it fails, it generates nothing. The probability of a successful project is
β, where β also represents a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability type. A successful project does not mean
that the loan will be repaid since ﬁrms can also strategically default (Park and Shen, 2002).
Suppose that the probability of a ﬁrm strategically defaulting is 1 − e, where e is the bank
manager’s monitoring eﬀort. The cost of monitoring is C(e)/b, where C0(e) > 0, C00(e) > 0.
The parameter b represents bank manager ability, with monitoring costs decreasing in b.
Assuming that β and e are independent, the probability of the bank getting repaid is βe,
which increases with both β and e, where β and e are complementary. Assume that β for
TEs and PEs has the same distribution, and is distributed on [0,β].
The bank’s proﬁt from lending to a ﬁrm is βer − 1. For a PE, the bank manager cares
about the proﬁtability of lending only, thus the utility of lending to a PE is
U1 = a(βer − 1) − C(e)/b, (1)
where a is the proﬁt incentive of the bank manager. For a TE, however, the bank also cares
about the perks generated from lending, L.6 These perks are tied to the bank manager’s
6This follows the formulation of Becker (1957), in which an economic agent cares about taste on top of
proﬁts.
8relationship with township government leaders. Thus, the bank’s utility when lending to a
TE is
U2 = a(βer − 1) − C(e)/b + L. (2)
It is easily seen that if a TE and a PE are equally proﬁtable, with the same β, then the
bank will exert the same optimal eﬀort, e∗, in both ﬁrms. Since there is a lump-sum perk
from lending to a TE, the bank prefers a TE in this case.7
The bank has enough funding for M ﬁrms, where M < 2N. So only some of the ﬁrms
will be ﬁnanced. The bank maximizes the sum of utility from each of the M ﬁrms to which
it lends, or
X
YiU1i +
X
YjU2j. (3)
Here Y = 1 if a ﬁrm receives a loan, and Y = 0 otherwise; and i and j are indexes for a PE
and TE, respectively. Assume for simplicity that the total eﬀort is less than the available
eﬀort, or
P
e∗
i +
P
e∗
j < e.8 We will show in this case that the marginal PE being ﬁnanced is
more proﬁtable than the marginal TE being ﬁnanced. Deﬁne β1 and β2 as the proﬁt types
of the marginal PE and TE that get bank loans. In other words, for ﬁrms that get loans, β1
is the lowest proﬁt type of a PE, and β2 is the lowest proﬁt type of a TE. We can summarize
the above argument in Proposition 1. Proofs of propositions are in the appendix.
PROPOSITION 1: When there are only perks for lending to TEs, banks will discriminate
against PEs. This is reﬂected in the fact that the marginal PE being ﬁnanced is more prof-
itable than the marginal TE being ﬁnanced, or β1 > β2.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is simple. The bank chooses ﬁrms to lend so as to maximize
its total utility. The process of choosing ﬁrms can be described as ﬁrst ranking all ﬁrms by
the maximized bank utility from lending to each ﬁrm, and then picking the M top-ranking
ﬁrms. The marginal PE and marginal TE have to generate the same utility for the bank,
otherwise, the bank can increase its total utility by lending to more (less) of the ﬁrms in the
7Algebraically, since the maximized utility is U2(e∗) = a(βe∗r −1)−C(e∗)/b+L for a TE, but U1(e∗) =
a(βe∗r − 1) − C(e∗)/b for a PE, U1(e∗) − U2(e∗) = L > 0.
8This assumption can be justiﬁed if it is easier for banks to hire additional people to monitor ﬁrms than
to obtain more funds for lending. In fact, funding is typically a bottleneck for these banks.
9ownership group with the high (low) marginal utility. Because lending to a TE generates
perks, the marginal PE has to be more proﬁtable than the marginal TE, or β1 > β2. This
means that more TEs than PEs get bank loans, and that the average proﬁtability of TEs
is lower than PEs. Proposition 1 also implies that bank eﬀort in the marginal PE is higher
than that in the marginal TE. This is Lemma 1.
LEMMA 1: Eﬀort in the marginal PE is higher than that in the marginal TE, or e∗
1 > e∗
2.
Lemma 1 follows immediately from Proposition 1. Since incentives and eﬀort are com-
plementary, larger incentives in the marginal PE mean a larger eﬀort level. We will use
Lemma 1 to conduct some simple comparative statics, which illustrate how discrimination
changes with the change of parameters a, b and L. The comparative statics are summarized
in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: The degree of discrimination decreases with the bank manager’s incen-
tives, a, bank manager’s ability, b, and increases with the amount of perks, L. At the same
time, there will be more PEs and less TEs being ﬁnanced, and the average proﬁtability of
lending will increase. Algebraically, ∂β1/∂a < 0, ∂β2/∂a > 0; ∂β1/∂b < 0, ∂β2/∂b > 0;
∂β1/∂L > 0, ∂β2/∂L < 0.
The intuition for the change of incentives is straightforward. When incentives increase,
banks will exert more eﬀort monitoring all ﬁrms that receive loans, and the increase of eﬀort,
together with the increase of incentives, increases the maximized utility of lending to each
ﬁrm. This argument also applies for the marginal PE and TE. But, since the marginal
PE is of larger proﬁt type than the marginal TE, and ﬁrm proﬁt type and eﬀort are both
complementary with incentives, the increase of utility for the marginal PE is larger than
that for the marginal TE, or ∂U∗
1/∂a > ∂U∗
2/∂a. This implies that with the increase of
incentives, the utility of lending to the old marginal PE is larger than that of lending to the
old marginal TE. In order to equalize the utility of lending to the two marginal ﬁrms, the
bank has to lower the proﬁtability of the marginal PE and increase that of the marginal TE.
This change not only reduces discrimination, but also improves the total proﬁtability of the
10bank since the new PEs getting bank loans are better than those old TEs that lose their
loans.
The change of the bank manager’s ability has a similar eﬀect. When a manager’s ability
increases, they will exert more eﬀort monitoring the marginal ﬁrms, which increases the
maximized utility of each ﬁrm. But, since ability and eﬀort are complementary, the increase
of utility for the marginal PE is larger than that for the marginal TE, or ∂U∗
1/∂b > ∂U∗
2/∂b.
This implies that with the increase of ability, the utility of lending to the marginal PE is
larger than that of lending to the marginal TE. In order to equalize the two, the bank has to
lower the proﬁtability of the marginal PE and increase that of the marginal TE. This means
that fewer TEs get loans than before, while more PEs get loans than before.
The eﬀect of a change of perks is more direct. A decrease of bank perks does not change
bank eﬀorts for each ﬁrm, but it decreases the utility of lending to a TE. In order maintain
equality between the utility of lending to a marginal TE and PE, the bank has to lower the
proﬁtability of the marginal PE and increase that of the marginal TE.
5 The Data
The data we use are drawn from a bank-ﬁrm survey the authors conducted with Chinese
colleagues in the summer of 1998. The survey was carried out in 59 townships in 15 counties
in the coastal provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and focused on the period between 1994 and
1997. The selection of the counties and townships was designed to ensure a representative
cross-section of the region. The unique dimension of the survey is the matched ﬁrm-bank
data.
In each township, we randomly sampled three ﬁrms from the pool of all TEs that operated
in 1994, as well as all private ﬁrms that were of comparable size.9 We interviewed each ﬁrm
manager in length about their ﬁrm, including bank borrowing, and also collected detailed
data on the ﬁrm’s operations, e.g. employment, sales, and ﬁnancial assets and liabilities.
Altogether, 168 ﬁrms were randomly selected and surveyed, or three per township. Out
of these ﬁrms, 33 were established as private ﬁrms (henceforth private ﬁrms or PEs). The
9Enterprises were required to have at least 20 employees and a minimum ﬁxed capital of 200,000 RMB.
11remaining 135 ﬁrms were originally set up and owned by the local township government
(henceforth township enterprises or TEs). Between 1994 and 1997, however, 88 out of these
135 ﬁrms were sold oﬀ to private owners, and became privatized ﬁrms. Privatization, in our
paper, means that majority ownership shifted from the government to private individuals.
As noted above, 1994 eﬀectively marks the beginning of privatization eﬀorts in the region.
At the end of 1997, 47 ﬁrms remained government-owned.
We also surveyed the township branch of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and
the local Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC). Data on ABC and RCC lending to each of
the surveyed ﬁrms were obtained. We also collected information on bank managers, their
incentive structures, and branch performance, the latter primarily in the form of detailed
balance sheet data. There are considerable diﬀerences across townships with respect to
managerial incentives, role of proﬁtability, etc., heterogeneity that we exploit later in the
paper.
Finally, we also have credit rating information on our sample of ﬁrms from each of the
banks. This unique feature of the data allows us to control for the credit worthiness in
our regressions. The credit rating is on a scale from 1-6 (6 is the highest ranking) and was
constructed separately by each bank for each ﬁrm.
6 Does Ownership Matter?
If private and privatized ﬁrms are discriminated against, we expect to ﬁnd that they are
less likely to get a bank loan and/or obtain smaller loans, all else equal. Banks may also
apply a higher lending standard for private and privatized ﬁrms. We will examine both the
probability of a ﬁrm obtaining a bank loan and loan application requirements.
6.1 Probability of having a bank loan
In Table 1, we report summary data for 1994 and 1997 on loans from the ABC and RCC
branches by ownership group for 152 out of our sample of 168 ﬁrms.10 There are stark
diﬀerences in both years in access to credit between private and township enterprises. In
10We lose 16 observations due to missing values for some variables.
121994, more than half (56 percent) of all private ﬁrms did not receive a loan from either bank
branch; slightly more than a third (38 percent) received a loan from one of them; and 6
percent received loans from both. In contrast, slightly more than 80 percent of all township
enterprises received loans, with a third actually receiving loans from both institutions.11
There are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the size of loans received. On average, township
enterprises received four times as much credit as private ﬁrms (1.65 million RMB versus 0.43
million RMB).
These diﬀerences carry through using the data for 1997, with one important addition:
Between 1994 and 1997, a widening gap emerges in the average amount of credit received by
township enterprises and those township enterprises that were subsequently privatized. In
1994, the diﬀerence was 0.63 million RMB; by 1997, it had increased to 1.61 million. Over
this three-year period, credit to privatized TEs failed to increase. In general, the data in
Table 1 show that most of the new credit extended by ABC and RCC branches between
1994 and 1997 to the ﬁrms in our sample went to the 39 township enterprises that remained
under government ownership.
To analyze more formally the eﬀect of ownership on credit access, we estimate separate
probit models for 1994 and 1997 of the probability of a ﬁrm obtaining a bank loan. We
also report Tobit estimates on loan size for comparison. The convention in the literature is
to estimate loan denial equations, based on bank loan application data. The problem with
this approach is that it excludes ﬁrms that may not have applied because they expected
their application to be rejected. In our empirical work, we include all ﬁrms that reported
that they demanded loans from the ABC or RCC. The implicit assumption here then is that
banks were not willing to lend to those ﬁrms that reported that their bank loans were equal
to zero.
The key to identifying the eﬀect of ownership on ﬁrm access to credit is to control for ﬁrm-
level variables, e.g. credit worthiness, which are also likely correlated with ﬁrm borrowing.
Failure to do so adequately can result in a potential omitted variable bias in our estimation
of the eﬀect of ownership on credit access, and lead us to confer too much weight on its eﬀect
11Recall that in 1994 township ﬁrms include ﬁrms identiﬁed in Table 1 as “Privatized TEs”.
13in bank decision-making. Our survey provides information on each ﬁrm’s assets, sales, age,
debt-asset ratio, capital-labor ratio, and bank credit rating, in addition to information on the
manager’s education and experience. Table A1 provides summary data on these variables
for our three ownership groups.
Tables 2 and 3 report the results from our Probit and Tobit analysis for 1994 and 1997,
using several alternative sets of ﬁrm-level controls.12 In each regression, we also include a set
of dummies for industry sector, bank type (ABC or RCC), and province. As a benchmark,
we report the Probit and Tobit results with only the ownership dummies included, and
controls for bank type, province and industry sector. The parameter estimates for the eﬀect
of ownership for each year are consistent across the rows of Table 2.13 For 1994, private
ﬁrms were nearly sixty percent less likely to obtain a loan compared to township enterprises.
On average, they received 250,000 RMB less in loans than a comparable TE. There are
no diﬀerences, however, in the likelihood of credit access or loan size between township
enterprises, and those township enterprises that were later privatized. In 1997, private ﬁrms
are again less likely than government-owned ﬁrms in obtaining credit, albeit slightly lower
than in 1994, i.e. ﬁfty percent vs. sixty percent. The gap in loan size, however, nearly
doubled. Note, however, that in 1997 township enterprises that were privatized during
the previous three years experienced a signiﬁcantly lower probability of receiving a bank
loan than ﬁrms that remained under government-ownership. Moreover, they also received
considerably smaller loans than TEs.
6.2 Firms’ credit ratings
In our regressions, the most important control variable measuring a ﬁrm’s credit worthiness
is the ﬁrm’s credit rating, which has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect in each of the probit
regressions for 1997. The credit rating, which is a score given by each bank to a ﬁrm, is based
on the ﬁrm’s past credit history, proﬁtability, sales, and the ﬁrm manager’s attributes. If
12We only have credit rating information for 1994 for a small subset of ﬁrms, and so use the 1997 credit
rating in the 1994 regressions. For those ﬁrms for which we have credit rating information for both years,
the ratings are very similar. Using the 1997 credit rating in the regression for 1994 will not introduce any
bias as long as access to credit in 1994 does not by itself inﬂuence the credit rating in 1997.
13We report the marginal eﬀect on probability of each independent variable (dF/dx) rather than estimated
coeﬃcients.
14private and privatized ﬁrms indeed are less creditworthy, then including their credit rating as
a control variable should reduce the magnitude of the coeﬃcients on the ownership indicators
signiﬁcantly.
The regression results in Table 2 indicate, however, that private and privatized ﬁrms
may not be less creditworthy. Including the credit rating has a negligible eﬀect on the
coeﬃcients of the ownership indicators (column 2 vs. 3). Private and privatized ﬁrms
remain signiﬁcantly less likely to have access to credit from the ABC or RCC, and are lent
less. This suggests that the credit ratings of private and privatized ﬁrms are fairly similar
to those of township enterprises.
To further examine if ownership itself is an important determinant of a ﬁrm’s credit
rating, we estimated the ﬁrm’s credit rating function using OLS. The independent variables
include those in Table 2 and measures of a ﬁrm’s credit history and performance. If we
ﬁnd that private and privatized ﬁrms have lower credit ratings, all else equal, there are
two potential reasons. First, it could be that banks observe certain credit qualiﬁcations
that are unobservable to the econometrician. Second, it could be that private ownership is
discriminated against in the credit rating stage. If it is the latter, some of the eﬀect of the
discrimination could actually be masked by the inclusion of the ﬁrm’s credit rating.
The regressions, however, suggest that controlling for a number of ﬁrm-level variables,
credit ratings are not lower for private or privatized ﬁrms (Table 4). Variables with the
most explanatory power of the credit rating are loan history and ﬁrm size. We ﬁnd that the
credit rating increases with ﬁrm size and loan history, but decreases with bad credit history
(overdue loans). None of the ownership indicators are signiﬁcant however. This helps rule
out the concerns above, and increases our conﬁdence that the credit rating is a good measure
for a ﬁrm’s credit worthiness and the ownership indicators are picking up the eﬀect of bank
discrimination.
6.3 Loan requirements
Discrimination against private ownership can also be tested by examining if private and
privatized ﬁrms are subject to higher loan standards. Most of the literature on bank dis-
15crimination uses interest rates and loan length as indicators of discrimination in ex ante
loan requirements (Blanchﬂower et al., 1998). In China, however, interest rates and loan
length are not particularly good measures for loan standards because they are not market-
determined. “Base” interest rates for short and long-term loans are determined by the
People’s Bank of China (PBC), and local bank branches only have minor discretion in ad-
justing actual rates above the PBC base. Loan length, on the other hand, is also set by PBC
rules; a majority of loans are short-term, almost all of which are for 6 months.
China’s banking sector, however, provides several unique indicators for loan requirements,
including the percentage of a loan that is collateralized. There are three kinds of loans in
China: guaranteed, collateralized and credit-rating-based (xinyong) loans.14 Before China
issued the law on loan collateral in 1995, almost all loans were guaranteed loans, with the
guarantors exclusively government agents or township enterprises. The 1995 law required
more loans to be collateralized, and banks started to require borrowers to provide collateral.
This law, as is true for any law in China, was not uniformly implemented, and we observe
diﬀerences across localities, and ﬁrm ownership groups.
In Table 5, we analyze the determinants of loan collateral. We regress the percentage
of a loan that was collatarized on our ownership dummies, and the same set of control
variables as used before. The regressions for 1997 imply that the loan collateral for private
(privatized) ﬁrms is 70 (40) percentage points higher than that for township enterprises in
1997 (Table 5, columns 1-3). Even in 1994, when the collateral law was ﬁrst being drafted
and experimented with, private ﬁrms were required to put up more collateral (columns 4-5)
than the township enterprises.
In summary, we ﬁnd that private and privatized ﬁrms are less likely to obtain an access
to bank loans and they are subject to higher loan standards. Results from Tobit regressions
on loan amounts are consistent with those of Probit regressions: private and privatized
ﬁrms receive less in loans than do township enterprises. By all indications then, private and
privatized ﬁrms are discriminated in China’s formal loan markets. In the next two sections,
14Note that the three kinds of loans are not mutually exclusive. The bank can require both collateral and
guarantees for a loan. For other loans, the credit rating may not ﬁgure in the assessment.
16we will investigate the consequences and the sources of discrimination.
7 Consequences of Discrimination: Alternative Credit
Sources
RCCs and ABCs were not the only source of credit for ﬁrms. Other banks were a potential
source of borrowing, as were trade credits from suppliers. Firms also borrowed directly from
other ﬁrms, individuals, and non-ﬁnancial institutions. The overall eﬀect of the lending
behavior of ABCs and RCCs on these ﬁrms depends on the latter’s ability to access other
sources of credit, and the terms on which they can borrow. In principle, these other sources
of credit can oﬀset the observed diﬃculty of private and privatized ﬁrms from borrowing
from the ABCs and RCCs.
In Table 6, we report summary information on ﬁrms’ debt structure for 1994 and 1997.
Firms are once again divided into township enterprises, township enterprises that were pri-
vatized between 1994 and 1997, and private ﬁrms. We report information on total loans
from ABCs and RCCs, loans from other banks, trade credits, and other debts.15 Overall,
ABCs and RCCs were the most important source of credit for ﬁrms. In 1994, TEs (and TEs
that were subsequently privatized) borrowed signiﬁcantly more on average from ABCs and
RCCs, and more in total, than did private ﬁrms. Private ﬁrms were, however, more likely to
obtain credit through suppliers, which was the source of slightly less than half of their total
credit.
Between 1994 and 1997, total credit from all sources increased for all three ﬁrms. Yet
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across these ﬁrms. For TEs, total credit increased by 16.2
percent per annum; for private ﬁrms, 18.7 percent, but for TEs that were privatized, only
8.3 percent. The key factor underlying these diﬀerences is the access to new credit from
ABCs and RCCs. For TEs, credit from these two ﬁnancial institutions increased by 13.8
percent; for private ﬁrms, by 6.2 percent, but for the privatized TEs, credit from the ABCs
and RCCs actually declined 2.5 percent. Although the privatized TEs were able to access
additional credit from other sources, the decline in credit from the ABCs and RCCs largely
15Other debts include mainly wage, tax and township fee arrears.
17explains their slower growth in total credit.
In Table 7, we report the results of OLS models examining the determinants of alter-
native sources of ﬁnancing between 1994 and 1997, and the change between 1994 and 1997
conditional on information in 1994. We only report the coeﬃcients on the ownership dum-
mies, however, the regressions include the same set of controls as in column 3 of Table 2.
The coeﬃcients represent the eﬀect of being a private or privatized ﬁrm on the total amount
of (change in) credit from each source in 1994 and 1997 relative to that received by a TE,
controlling for diﬀerences in ﬁrm-level attributes.16 On average, private and privatized ﬁrms
experienced a smaller increase in credit from the ABC and RCCs than did TEs. This was
slightly reinforced by less credit from other banks. Privatized ﬁrms, however, were better
able to draw on supplier credits than were TEs; for private ﬁrms, the diﬀerences are small
and insigniﬁcant. Overall, access to supplier credits helped narrow the gap in access to credit
for privatized ﬁrms. For private ﬁrms, however, a gap persisted, though econometrically we
are not able to measure the gap with high precision.
How do we interpret these results? By all indications, private ﬁrms were not able to
oﬀset their diﬃculty in borrowing from the ABCs and RCCs by tapping credit from other
sources. For privatized ﬁrms, on the other hand, much depends on the relative costs of
borrowing from these alternative sources. If we thought that the cost of trade credits was
less than or equal to that of bank borrowing, then we can argue that the discrimination
in the market was negligible. Yes, these ﬁrms faced new diﬃculty in accessing credit from
the ABCs and RCCs once they were privatized, but other ﬁrms were more than willing to
ﬁll the gap, thereby eliminating the negative eﬀect on ownership on overall access to credit.
Interviews with managers and anecdotal information, however, suggest that trade credits
and bank credits were not perfect substitutes.
Trade credits are inferior to bank loans for several reasons. First, because of government
regulation, the interest rate on bank loans was much lower than the market rate. Our
interviews with bank mangers in 1998 show that the bank’s lending rate at that time was
16The coeﬃcients on the loans from the ABC and RCC are not comparable to those in Table 2 because
we are looking at the total credit from both.
18about 9 percent for ABC branches and 10 percent for RCC branches, but the bank managers
believed that the true market rate was 15 percent. Firms, in fact, could make money by
borrowing from banks, and then lending indirectly to other ﬁrms through trade credit.
As a result, it is very unlikely that these ﬁrms would prefer trade credit to bank loans.
Second, trade credits were typically for much shorter periods, thereby limiting some of their
usefulness. For example, a private ﬁrm could not rely on these credits for ﬁnancing long-
term investment. Examining our data on ﬁrm ﬁxed capital assets (See Table A1), we observe
that private and privatized ﬁrms experienced signiﬁcantly smaller increases in investment
between 1994 and 1997 relative to their output contribution than did TEs. In 1994, private
and soon-to-be privatized TEs were the source of more than 60 percent of total ﬁrm sales,
yet experienced less than 40 percent of the total increase in physical capital. And third,
the ﬁrms that were in the best position to oﬀer supplier credits were the much larger, and
often, monopolistic SOEs that were able to access loans from the state-owned banks. In
general, we expect ﬁrms obtaining supplier credits to have paid a premium in the form of
either higher prices or interest rates on overdue balances.
8 Sources of Discrimination
Our ﬁndings that private or privatized ﬁrms have a lower probability of obtaining a bank
loan could be due to several reasons, some of which may be interpreted as discrimination,
but others that may not. We will show in this section that the diﬀerences in the probability
of getting loans in China are indeed a product of discrimination that can be linked to bank
incentives. To make this point, we ﬁrst need to rule out a role of either informational or
statistical discrimination in China’s bank loan market.
8.1 Does information matter?
One potential reason that private ownership is less favored in the loan markets is that banks
possess less information about these ﬁrms. This lack of information could be due to historical
reasons or network eﬀects (Fafchamp, 1999). Private ﬁrms did not exist when China began
reforming its economy in 1978, and throughout the 1980s state banks had very limited
19experience in dealing with them.
The privatization of ﬁrms between 1994 and 1997, and bank loan data for both years
enable us to examine this possibility. If information is the underlying reason for the unfa-
vorable position of private ownership in the formal loan market, then it should be a problem
only for private ﬁrms, but not for privatized ﬁrms. Since governments used to own privatized
ﬁrms, banks should have experience dealing with them before they were privatized. If dis-
crimination against privatized ﬁrms is due to the lack of information, then these ﬁrms should
have been discriminated the same way before privatization. We test if privatized ﬁrms were
discriminated the same way before and after privatization by comparing either the probabil-
ity of privatized ﬁrms getting a bank loan or loan size in 1994 (before privatization) and 1997
(after privatization). If these same ﬁrms had the same probability of getting a loan as other
township enterprises before they were privatized, but have a lower probability afterwards (or
experienced a reduction in loan size subsequent to privatization), then information should
not be the underlying reason for discrimination. Regressions in Table 2 show that privatized
ﬁrms do not have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of getting bank loans in 1994, but have a
signiﬁcantly lower probability of getting a bank loan in 1997. We observe a similar change
with respect to loan size (Table 3). These results suggest that information is not the major
reason behind discrimination.
8.2 Loan default rate: statistical discrimination and joint-liability
Banks may also be reluctant to lend to private ﬁrms because of information asymmetries
for all ﬁrms. When banks do not observe the ﬁrms’ true credit worthiness, they may be
less willing to lend to ﬁrms of private ownership because these ﬁrms historically tended to
default more on average than township enterprises. This is the case of statistical discrim-
ination (Schwab, 1986; Arrow, 1998; Darity and Mason, 1998; Yinger, 1998). Statistical
discrimination can be a rational decision of banks that ﬁnd it too costly or impossible to
collect detailed information on ﬁrms’ credit worthiness. They use the free information at
their access, namely, ﬁrm ownership, as the criterion for judging a ﬁrm’s credit worthiness.
We test if discrimination is statistical by examining the ex post loan default rates of
20diﬀerent ownership groups. A presumption of statistical discrimination is that private and
privatized ﬁrms default more often than township enterprises. If we ﬁnd otherwise, then
statistical discrimination may not be the underlying reason for diﬀerential loan access. Es-
timating the ex post default rate also enables us to test if joint liability is a reason for
discrimination. The joint liability theory (Park and Shen, 2000) predicts that township en-
terprises have lower default rates because these ﬁrms pool their risks. When a township
enterprise is facing loan repayment diﬃculty, other township enterprises help the ﬁrm repay
its bank loans, and thus avoid default.
Table 8 reports Probit regression results on the probability a ﬁrm had an overdue loan
(a measure of default) in either 1997 or 1994, conditional on the ﬁrm having a loan in that
year. Since only one private ﬁrm had an overdue loan in 1997 and none had an overdue
loan in 1994, private ﬁrms drop out from the regressions. The coeﬃcients on the privatized
indicator are all negative and signiﬁcant for 1997, with an magnitude of -0.12 to -0.16. This
means that, all else equal, privatized ﬁrms are 12-16 percentage points less likely to default.
Privatized ﬁrms in 1994 (or the year before they were privatized), however, were equally
likely to have an overdue loan as other township enterprises. These results are inconsistent
with either the statistical discrimination hypothesis or the joint liability hypothesis.
8.3 Bank’s incentives
We argue in this paper that discrimination against private ﬁrms is very likely the result of
banks’ incentives. Banks are willing to sacriﬁce proﬁtability to lend to township enterprises
because bank managers often only beneﬁt marginally from higher bank proﬁtability; and
because they are able to enjoy perks through good relationships with local government of-
ﬁcials that are maintained through loans to the TEs. Recall that local government oﬃcials
often play an important role in bank manager selection and promotion. There are also many
private beneﬁts bank managers can enjoy by maintaining good relationship with govern-
ments. For example, local oﬃcials can use their political power to help arrange a job for
bank managers’ relatives, or entry into the party.
Banks’ incentives, however, are heterogeneous across localities, reﬂecting the unevenness
21and decentralized nature of the reform process. Our theory predicts that bank mangers that
have good incentive contracts care more about proﬁtability and less about ownership itself,
and therefore, to be less likely to discriminate against private ﬁrms. In addition, our theory
predicts that for better-educated bank managers, all else equal, there are higher returns
to lending proﬁtably than to pursuing perks through relationships with local government
oﬃcials. In other words, we expect that banks that have good incentives and/or well-
educated managers are less likely to discriminate against private ﬁrms. We also expect
that banks with good connections with the government enjoy more perks from lending to
township enterprises, and should also discriminate more.
To examine these links, we divide the sample into two sub-samples by the medians of bank
managers’ attributes, including their bonus-wage ratio, the weight on proﬁtability, education,
experience, and years of residence in the township of the bank branch. The bonus-wage ratio
is measured ex-ante, and tells us the size of the manager’s bonus relative to their base wage
if they meet all branch targets. The coeﬃcient on proﬁtability measures how much weight
the upper level bank branch puts on proﬁtability versus other objectives, such as deposit
growth, bank security and administration, when evaluating the performance of local bank
branches. We use the bank manager’s years of residence in the township as a measure of
their connections with the local governments. We hypothesize that bank managers with
more powerful incentives, good human capital and less connections with the township will
discriminate less.
In Table 9, we report the coeﬃcients on the two ownership dummies from estimating
Probit regressions for 1997 with the same set of controls as column 3 of Table 2, but separately
for ﬁrms above and below the median for each ﬁrm-level attribute. Altogether, there are ﬁve
pairs of estimates to compare. The results in Table 9 nicely conﬁrm our hypothesis. All the
coeﬃcients on ownership indicators are negative and signiﬁcant when using the sub-sample
of ﬁrms with weak incentives or human capital, and strong connections with the township
(rows 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10). For example, in localities in which the bonus-ﬁxed wage ratio is
less than the median, private and privatized ﬁrms are 85.9 percent and 37.4 percent less
22likely to receive a bank loan. In townships in which the ratio is above the median, however,
private and privatized ﬁrms are as likely as comparable township enterprises to receive a loan.
When proﬁtability is given 100 percent weight in the bank’s objectives, privatized ﬁrms do
not appear to be discriminated against. As for private ﬁrms, although the coeﬃcient on the
ownership dummy is negative and signiﬁcant, it is much smaller (in absolute value) than
when less than 100 percent weight is given to proﬁtability (-0.714 vs. -0.321).
8.4 Omitted variable bias
The ﬁnding that private ﬁrms are more likely to receive loans in townships in which banks
have good incentives or human capital might be due to omitted variable bias. If ﬁrms of
private ownership are better where banks have good incentives and human capital, then
we cannot rule out the possibility that bank attributes are simply picking up unobserved
diﬀerences in the quality of private and privatized ﬁrms across localities. Our grouping
simply separates good private (privatized) ﬁrms from bad private (privatized) ﬁrms. If we
cannot fully control for the eﬀect of ﬁrm quality, then our estimation of ownership eﬀects
would be biased upward for the good bank attribute (high private ﬁrm quality) group and
downward for the bad bank attribute (low private ﬁrm quality) group.
We use four methods to test and control for the unobserved variable bias of this sort.
First, we calculate for each ownership group average performance measures and check whether
private and privatized ﬁrms are systematically better in areas where banks have better at-
tributes. Our performance measures include proﬁt-capital ratio, proﬁt-labor ratio, sales-
capital ratio and sales-labor ratio. We do not ﬁnd that privatized ﬁrms are systematically
better than township enterprises (results not reported in tables).
Second, we test whether privatized ﬁrms in certain localities are less likely to get bank
loans before privatization. If privatized ﬁrms in localities where banks are bad are low-quality
ﬁrms, then they should also be relatively less likely to get bank loans before privatization.
If we fail to ﬁnd that privatized ﬁrms in these localities are less likely to get loans pre-
privatization, then their post-privatization lower probability of getting a bank loan could
be due to discrimination against private ownership. To implement this idea, we divide
23the 1994 sample of ﬁrms by 1997 bank attributes, and estimate for the two sub-samples
(above and below the median) the eﬀect of being privatized on the probability of credit
access. The dependent variable is an indicator, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm has a loan in
1994, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the same as column 3 in Table 2.
Regression results show that privatized ﬁrms in the “good bank” attributes’ groups do not
systematically get more loans before privatization, since none of the coeﬃcients on privatized
ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly negative (Table 10, column 1). This indicates that privatized ﬁrms
are not systematically more credit-worthy in the good bank attributes’ groups.
Third, we employ ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation. Speciﬁcally, we use the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
all variables that vary across years and examine whether the change of ownership aﬀects
the change of loan in localities of diﬀerent bank attributes. Assuming that unobserved ﬁrm
quality does not vary across years, the ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect model will eliminate these factors and
provide unbiased estimations. Private ﬁrms will drop out of the sample in the ﬁxed-eﬀect
model, since their ownership does not change over time. The dependent variable of the ﬁxed
eﬀect model is an indicator, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm has a loan increase between 1994 and
1997, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables include the change of manager’s education
and age and a privatization indicator. The regression results of the ﬁxed eﬀect model conﬁrm
our earlier ﬁndings that banks with managers who have weak incentives, less education and
experience, and strong connections with the township, are more likely to discriminate (Table
10, column 2).
The ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect model may not completely correct the omitted variable bias however.
If the change of ownership is correlated with bank attributes, then the change of ownership
itself is endogenous. In other words, it could be that good ﬁrms are privatized in localities
where banks have good incentives, while bad ﬁrms are privatized in localities where banks
have poor incentives. In this case, bank attributes are simply picking up the quality of
privatized ﬁrms (relative to township enterprises in each group) in diﬀerent localities.
Finally, we test directly whether ownership change is the result of the interaction between
ﬁrm quality and bank attributes by applying a Probit model to estimate the probability
24of privatization. The right hand size variables are ﬁrm attributes, bank attributes and
interactions of bank and ﬁrm attributes. If the interaction terms are not signiﬁcant, then we
can reject the hypothesis that good ﬁrms are privatized in localities where banks are good,
while bad ﬁrms are privatized where banks are bad. Regressions show that the interaction
terms are not signiﬁcant (not shown in tables).
To summarize, our empirical exercises show that bank discrimination decreases with
bank managers’ incentives, human capitals, and increases with their connections with local
governments. The results are robust to various ways of correcting omitted variable bias.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze commercial bank lending behavior in rural China. By all in-
dications, private and privatized ﬁrms have been discriminated against in the formal loan
market. This discrimination is not uniform across our sample, however, and is systematically
correlated with bank manager’s incentives and human capital: banks discriminate less when
bank managers have good incentives and human capital.
The discrimination that persists has important real consequences for the Chinese economy
as bank credits do not go to the most proﬁtable projects, and the most eﬃcient ﬁrms have
to incur higher costs in order to expand. In both the short- and long-run, this will aﬀect
individual ﬁrm growth through access to working capital and through its eﬀect on ﬁrms’
ﬁxed investment. Discrimination against private ﬁrms also adversely aﬀects the “bottom
line” of China’s commercial banks, and their ability to deal with a legacy of non-performing
loans.
From both perspectives, our analysis highlights the need for continued reform of gov-
ernance structures in China’s ﬁnancial sector, and the local political economy that shapes
them.
Appendix
PROOF of PROPOSITION 1:
25If no PEs are being ﬁnanced, the problem is trivial, and so we will consider the case when
there are PEs being ﬁnanced. Deﬁne β2 as the type of the marginal TE, and β1 as the type
of the marginal PE. Since it must be true that the bank is indiﬀerent between lending to
the two ownership types at the margin, then U1(e∗
1)−U2(e∗
2) = 0, where U2(e∗
2) = a(β2e∗
2r −
1)−C(e∗
2)/b+L, and U1(e∗
1) = a(β1e∗
1r−1)−C(e∗
1)/b. Since ∂U(e∗)/∂β > 0, it follows that
β2 < β1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Again, we use the maximized utility function to conduct comparative statics. Totally diﬀer-
entiating the maximized utility functions with respect to a, we obtain ∂U∗
2/∂a = β2e∗
2r − 1,
and ∂U∗
1/∂a = β1e∗
1r−1. Since β1 > β2, and ∂e/∂β > 0, we know e∗
1 > e∗
2. This implies that
∂U∗
1/∂a > ∂U∗
2/∂a. So, at the old margin, lending to a PE is more proﬁtable than to a TE.
But, we know that the bank has to be indiﬀerent between the two ownership types at the
margin, and so the proﬁt type has to be lower than before for the marginal PE, and higher
for the marginal TE. Algebraically, β0
1 < β1 and β0
2 > β2. Since there is still discrimination
in equilibrium, it has to be true that β2 < β0
2 < β0
1 < β1. This means that the old borrowing
TEs in the proﬁt range [β2,β2] are replaced by the new borrowing PEs in the proﬁt range
[β0
1,β1], thus the average proﬁtability of the bank improves.
The proofs for the eﬀect of changes of b and L are similar, and are skipped here. Q.E.D.
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Table 1: Firm Loans from Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC) and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
   Ownership     
 TE  Privatized  TE  Private  Total 
Number of observations  39  81  32  152 
        
Loan from ABC and RCC in 1994        
   1 Percentage of firms with          
       no loan  18  20  56  27 
       One loan from RCC or ABC  51  44  38  45 
       Loans from both RCC and ABC  31  36  6  28 
        
   2 Average amount of loan (million yuan)  2.08 
(3.56) 
1.45 
(2.32) 
0.43 
(1.07) 
1.40 
(2.57) 
        
   3 Average amount of loan conditional on having  
      loan in at least one year (million yuan) 
2.32 
(3.68) 
1.63 
(2.40) 
0.72 
(1.32) 
1.69 
(2.73) 
        
Loan from ABC and RCC in 1997        
   4 Percentage of firms with          
      no loan  13  19  50  24 
      One loan from RCC or ABC  36  49  41  44 
      Loans from both RCC and ABC  51  32  9  32 
        
   5 Average amount of loan (million yuan)  3.12 
(4.13) 
1.51 
(1.98) 
0.64 
(1.44) 
1.74 
(2.75) 
        
   6 Average amount of loan conditional on having  
      loan in at least one year (million yuan) 
3.48 
(4.22) 
1.70 
(2.02) 
1.07 
(1.75) 
2.10 
(2.90) 
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Table 2: Probit Regressions Examining the Determinants of Having a Bank Loan in 1997 or 1994 Conditional on Firms 
Demanding a Loan (Dependent variable: no bank loan=0, have a bank loan =1) 
 
 
Independent variables 
(dF/dx) 
(1) 
 
1997 
(2) 
 
1997 
(3) 
 
1997 
(4) 
 
1997 
(5) 
 
1994 
(6) 
 
1994 
(7) 
 
1994 
Ownership Indicators         
    Private 
 
-0.382*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.544*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.514*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.491*** 
(-3.28) 
-0.409*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.650*** 
(-3.71) 
-0.632*** 
(-3.56) 
    Privatized  
    (between 94-97) 
-0.201*** 
(-2.56) 
-0.212*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.199** 
(-2.48) 
-0.176** 
(-2.03) 
-0.018 
(-0.21) 
-0.027 
(-0.31) 
-0.004 
(-0.04) 
Credit Worthiness         
   Credit rating         0.051*** 
(2.94) 
0.046*** 
(2.61) 
   0.036* 
(1.95) 
   Firm manager’s  
   education 
 0.031* 
(1.73) 
0.026 
(1.42) 
0.020 
(1.10) 
 -0.002 
(-0.08) 
-0.008 
(-0.43) 
   Firm manager’s age    -0.004 
(-0.67) 
-0.002 
(-0.43) 
-0.003 
(-0.56) 
 0.002 
(0.48) 
0.003 
(0.59) 
   Firm’s age (=1 if  
   established after 1990) 
 0.222** 
(2.20) 
0.204** 
(2.00) 
0.193* 
(1.81) 
 0.367** 
(2.43) 
0.361** 
(2.43) 
   Sales (lagged)        0.002   
(1.17) 
   
   Debt asset ratio  
   (lagged) 
    -0.079 
(-0.69) 
   
   Capital labor ratio  
   (lagged) 
    0.0005 
(0.09) 
   
Other Control Variables        
   Bank type  (RCC=0,   
   ABC=1) 
-0.116* 
(-1.82) 
-0.119 
(-1.84) 
-0.092 
(-1.38) 
-0.096 
(-1.45) 
-0.162** 
(-2.36) 
-0.160** 
(-2.30) 
-0.137* 
(-1.93) 
   Province (Zhejiang=1)  -0.072 
(-1.03) 
-0.062 
(-0.80) 
-0.072 
(-0.91) 
-0.072 
(-0.90) 
-0.060 
(-0.81) 
-0.070 
(-0.88) 
-0.082 
(-1.02) 
         
Observation  238 238 238 238 216 216 216 
Pseudo R-squared  0.09  0.12 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 
Notes: 
1. Coefficients are dF/dx. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.  Significance level 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, **, 
and ***.  Industry dummies are not shown. 
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Table 3: Tobit Regressions Examining the Determinants of Loan Amount in 1997 or 1994 Conditional on Firms 
Demanding a Loan (left censored at zero) 
 
 
Independent variables 
(dF/dx) 
(1) 
 
1997 
(2) 
 
1997 
(3) 
 
1997 
(4) 
 
1997 
(5) 
 
1994 
(6) 
 
1994 
(7) 
 
1994 
Ownership 
Indicators 
         
    Private 
 
-605.3*** 
(-5.33) 
-652.2*** 
(-5.16) 
-641.2*** 
(-5.04) 
-466.3*** 
(-3.70) 
-340.7*** 
(-3.58) 
-256.2** 
(-2.24) 
-252.9** 
(-2.20) 
    Privatized  
    (between 94-97) 
-330.4*** 
(-4.37) 
-341.9*** 
(-4.69) 
-336.7*** 
(-4.61) 
-219.8*** 
(-3.03) 
-68.0 
(-1.11) 
-65.9 
(-1.08) 
-63.6 
(-1.03) 
Credit Worthiness           
   Credit rating       13.1 
(0.81) 
-6.72 
(-0.44) 
   5.1 
(0.38) 
   Firm manager’s  
   education 
 42.7** 
(2.55) 
40.8** 
(2.42) 
21.4 
(1.34) 
 -3.1 
(-0.24) 
-4.1 
(-0.31) 
   Firm manager’s age    -8.6* 
(-1.78) 
-8.4* 
(-1.75) 
-13.3*** 
(-2.96) 
 -1.8 
(-0.59) 
-1.8 
(-0.58) 
   Firm’s age (=1 if  
   est. after 1990) 
 13.4 
(0.14) 
9.63 
(0.10) 
-113.2 
(-1.17) 
 -123.7 
(-1.35) 
-123.0 
(-1.34) 
   Sales (lagged)        3.7*** 
(5.35) 
   
   Debt asset ratio  
   (lagged) 
      -386.4***   
(-3.73) 
   
   Capital labor ratio  
   (lagged) 
     -0.9 
(-0.33) 
   
Other Control Variables          
   Bank type  (RCC=0,   
   ABC=1) 
-12.4 
(-0.20) 
-5.6 
(-0.09) 
1.1 
(0.02) 
-12.8 
(-0.23) 
-2.6 
(-1.11) 
-3.5 
(-0.07) 
1.1 
(0.02) 
   Province  
   (Zhejiang=1) 
86.47 
(1.24) 
114.4 
(1.55) 
110.5 
(1.50) 
113.0 
(1.62) 
26.7 
(0.49) 
25.8 
(0.45) 
110.5 
(1.50) 
           
Observation  238 238  238  238 216 216 216 
Pseudo R-squared  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.04 0.01 0.01 0.14 
Notes: 
1. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.  Significance level 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, **, and ***.  Industry 
dummies are not shown. 
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Table 4: OLS Regressions Examining the Determinants of Credit Ratings in 1997 
 
Independent variables 
 
Dependent variable: credit ratings in 1997 
 
    (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Ownership Indicators         
      Private
   -0.28 
(-0.70) 
-0.31 
(-0.70) 
-0.18 
(-0.42) 
-0.14 
(-0.34) 
      Privatized (between 94-97)    -0.33 
(-1.13) 
-0.33 
(-1.14) 
-0.12 
(-0.42) 
-0.24 
(-0.86) 
Loan History         
      Loan94 (=1 if there is a loan   
      in 1994) 
      0.67*** 
(2.88) 
      Overdue (1=if an overdue loan  
      in history 
      -1.02** 
(2.73) 
Credit Worthiness         
      Firm manager’s Education      0.11* 
(1.78) 
0.06 
(0.96) 
0.07 
(1.09) 
      Firm manager’s age      -0.02 
(-1.40) 
-0.03* 
(-1.94) 
-0.04** 
(-2.18) 
      Firm’s age (=1 if established  
      after 1990) 
   -0.06 
(-0.16) 
-0.07 
(-0.21) 
-0.09 
(-0.25) 
      Sales (lagged)        0.024*** 
(5.37) 
0.022*** 
(4.93) 
      Debt asset ratio (lagged)        -0.17 
(-0.44) 
-0.13 
(-0.34) 
      Capital labor ratio (lagged)        2.15* 
(1.83) 
2.18* 
(1.89) 
         
Other Control Variables         
      Bank type (RCC=0, ABC=1)    -0.45* 
(1.89) 
-0.44* 
(-1.88) 
-0.38* 
(-1.76) 
-0.27 
(-1.22) 
      Province (Zhejiang=1)    -0.01 
(-0.04) 
-0.075 
(-0.27) 
0.150 
(0.57) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
         
Observation    281 281 281  281 
Adjusted R-squared    0.00  0.01  0.14  0.17 
Notes:  
1. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.  Significance level 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, **, and ***.  Industry 
dummies are not shown. 
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Table 5: OLS Regressions Examining the Determinants of Loan Collateral  
  Dependent Variable: % loan collateralized 
 1997    1994 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5) 
Ownership Indicators            
      Private  85.90*** 
(6.34) 
74.83*** 
(4.83) 
67.14*** 
(3.72) 
 25.11* 
(1.81) 
33.44** 
(2.03) 
      Privatized (between 94-97)  48.00*** 
(5.68) 
47.79*** 
(5.59) 
43.94*** 
(4.23) 
 9.25 
(1.12) 
13.25 
(1.41) 
Credit Worthiness            
      Credit rating    -1.01 
(-0.52) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
    
      Firm manager’s Education    2.07 
(1.07) 
2.10 
(0.97) 
   -2.62 
(-1.22) 
      Firm manager’s age    0.13 
(0.25) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
   -0.17 
(-0.31) 
      Firm’s age (=1 if established  
      after 1990) 
 15.28 
(1.40) 
17.49 
(1.31) 
   5.39 
(0.44) 
      Sales (lagged)      -0.12 
(-1.56) 
    
      Debt asset ratio (lagged)      -5.79 
(-0.44) 
    
      Capital labor ratio (lagged)      -0.38 
(-0.94) 
    
            
Other Control Variables            
      Bank type (RCC=0, ABC=1)  -2.69 
(-0.39) 
-2.73 
(-0.39) 
-1.89 
(-0.24) 
 0.89 
(0.12) 
1.88 
(0.23) 
      Province (Zhejiang=1)  -5.26 
(-0.69) 
-2.18 
(-0.26) 
1.51 
(0.07) 
 -28.21*** 
(-3.60) 
-37.28*** 
(-3.87) 
            
Observation 144  144  144    141  123 
Adj. R-squared  0.27  0.26  0.23    0.08  0.08 
Notes:  
1. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.  Coefficients are dF/dx.  Significance level 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, 
**, and ***.  Industry dummies are not shown. 
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Table 6: Firm’s Debt Structure: Mean and Standard Deviation (million yuan) 
   1994       1997   
 TE  Privatized 
1994-97 
Private   TE  Privatized 
1994-97 
Private 
Number of observations  36  69  24    36  69  24 
             
Debts             
         Loan from ABC&RCC  2.23 
(3.66) 
1.59 
(2.43) 
0.56 
(1.22) 
 3.29 
(4.25) 
1.47 
(1.79) 
0.67 
(1.47) 
             
         Loan from other banks  0.22 
(0.89) 
0.87 
(3.54) 
0.22 
(0.88) 
 0.89 
(3.78) 
1.18 
(4.25) 
0.62 
(1.30) 
             
         Trade credit received  1.61 
(2.97) 
1.10 
(1.59) 
0.80 
(1.21) 
 1.64 
(2.97) 
1.81 
(2.82) 
0.91 
(1.34) 
             
         Other debt  1.70 
(2.96) 
0.82 
(1.04) 
0.40 
(0.89) 
 3.21 
(7.68) 
1.11 
(1.51) 
0.87 
(1.91) 
             
         Total   5.76 
(7.17) 
4.38 
(6.08) 
1.84 
(3.20) 
 9.03 
(12.94) 
5.56 
(8.02) 
3.08 
(4.39) 
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Table 7: Coefficients (t-ratios) of Ownership Indicators of OLS Models Examining the Determinants of 
Amount of Alternative Finance Sources  
Specifications   Private  Privatized 
(between 94-97) 
Sample size 
Amount in 1994      
      Total loan from ABC and RCC  -184.2* 
(-1.49) 
-60.8 
(-0.78) 
119 
      Total loan from all banks  -176.1 
(-1.07) 
16.6 
(0.16) 
119 
      Trade credit received  -52.1 
(-0.44) 
27.1 
(0.36) 
119 
      Other credit  -65.7 
(-0.78) 
-22.3 
(-0.42) 
119 
      Total firm debt  -293.9 
(-0.99) 
21.4 
(0.12) 
119 
      
Amount in 1997      
      Total loan from ABC and RCC  -430.7** 
(-2.57) 
-263.4** 
(-2.50) 
119 
      Total loan from all banks  -601.0** 
(-2.55) 
-211.9 
(-1.43) 
119 
      Trade credit received  -67.6 
(-0.37) 
152.9 
(1.34) 
119 
      Other credit  -111.2 
(-0.57) 
-58.1 
(-0.48) 
119 
      Total firm debt  -779.8 
(-1.63) 
-117.1 
(-0.39) 
119 
      
Change of amount between 94-97      
      Total loan from ABC and RCC  -256.0** 
(-2.04) 
-203.5*** 
(-2.71) 
119 
      Total loan from all banks  -367.0** 
(-2.41) 
-228.1** 
(-2.50) 
119 
      Trade credit received  31.0 
(0.34) 
148.5*** 
(2.72) 
119 
      Other credit  88.4 
(0.72) 
1.98 
(0.03) 
119 
      Total firm debt  -247.5 
(-1.14) 
-77.6 
(-0.60) 
119 
Notes: 
1. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
2. Significance level 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, **, and ***.   
3. The regressors of the regressions generating these coefficients are the same as column (3) in Table 2. 
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Table 8: Probit Regressions Examining the Determinants of Loan Performance (conditional on firm having a loan) 
  Dependent Variable: 1=loan overdue 
 1997    1994 
Independent variables (dF/dx) (1)  (2)    (3) 
Ownership Indicators        
      Privatized (between 94-97)  -0.163*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.124*** 
(-3.51) 
 0.017 
(0.35) 
Credit Worthiness         
      Credit rating   -0.049*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.017* 
(-1.90) 
  
      Firm manager’s Education  0.013 
(1.09) 
0.006 
(0.88) 
 -0.011 
(-0.86) 
      Firm manager’s age  0.001 
(0.39) 
0.0002 
(0.12) 
 -0.003 
(-0.92) 
      Firm’s age (=1 if established  
      after 1990) 
-0.047 
(-0.70) 
-0.033 
(-0.97) 
 0.097 
(1.09) 
      Sales (lagged)    -0.003 
(-1.57) 
  
      Debt asset ratio (lagged)    -0.065 
(-1.37) 
  
      Capital labor ratio (lagged)    0.002 
(1.10) 
  
        
Other Control Variables        
      Bank type (RCC=0, ABC=1)  0.043 
(0.91) 
0.020 
(0.76) 
 -0.046 
(-0.97) 
      Province (Zhejiang=1)  -0.203*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.108*** 
(-2.61) 
 -0.183*** 
(-2.94) 
      Industry sectors  Yes  Yes     
        
Observation 161  140    158 
Adj. R-squared  0.25  0.36    0.10 
Notes: 
1. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.  Coefficients are dF/dx. 
2. Significance level 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, **, and ***.  Industry dummies are not shown. 
3. Out of 20 private firm observations, only one has overdue loans in 1997, and none of the private firms have 
overdue loans in 1994.  That is why we drop private indicator in the regressions. 
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Table 9: Coefficients (t-ratios) of Ownership Indicators of Probit Models Examining the Determinants of 
Having Bank Loans in 1997 Conditional on Firms Demanding a Loan by Using Alternative Specifications 
(no loan=0 and having a loan=1) 
Specification (bank’s 1997 attributes)  Private  Privatized 
(between 94-97) 
Sample size 
Bank manager’s bonus/fixed-wage 
ratio 
    
      (1) Less than median (0.875)  -0.859*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.374*** 
(-2.67) 
125 
      (2) More than median  -0.040 
(-0.26) 
-0.096 
(-0.91) 
157 
Bank manager’s weight on 
profitability 
    
      (3) Less than 100%  -0.714** 
(-2.45) 
-0.320** 
(-2.42) 
105 
      (4) 100%  -0.321** 
(-2.52) 
-0.057 
(-0.59) 
176 
Bank manager’s schooling      
      (5) Less than 13 years  -0.606*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.256** 
(-2.21) 
105 
      (6) 13 years or above  -0.521*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.044 
(-0.46) 
177 
Bank manager’s experience      
      (7) No previous experience as a  
            branch manager or vice manager 
-0.602*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.220* 
(-1.76) 
133 
      (8) Was a branch manager or vice  
            manager before 
-0.349 
(-1.60) 
-0.271** 
(-2.52) 
135 
Bank manager’s years of residence in 
the township 
    
      (9) Less than 6 years  -0.380** 
(-2.39) 
0.049 
(0.46) 
141 
      (10) 6 years or above  -0.457*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.313*** 
(-2.94) 
146 
Notes:  
1. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. Coefficients are dF/dx.  
2. Significance level 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, **, and ***.   
3. The regressors of the regressions generating these coefficients are the same as column (3) in Table 2. 
4. The number of observations may differ due to missing values of bank attributes.  The median may not 
equally divide the sample because most of the bank attributes are discrete variables.  
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Table 10: Coefficients (t-ratios) of PRIVATIZED Firm Indicators of Probit Models Testing Omitted Variable 
Bias 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Credit Access in 1994  
 
Firms divided on basis 
of 1997 bank attributes 
 
1= a loan in 1994; 
0=otherwise 
 
Independent variables 
are 1994 values 
 
   
Fixed-effect model 
 
1=a loan increase 1994-1997; 
0=otherwise 
 
Independent variables are first 
differences, 1997-1994 
 
 
 
 
Sample 
size 
for  
both  
Bank manager’s bonus/fixed-wage 
ratio 
      
      (1) Less than median  0.039 
(0.37) 
 -0.307*** 
(-2.91) 
111 
      (2) More than median  -0.075 
(-0.77) 
 -0.096 
(-1.06) 
121 
Bank manager’s weight on 
profitability 
      
      (3) Less than 100%  0.110 
(0.93) 
 -0.446*** 
(-3.70) 
91 
      (4) 100%  0.001 
(0.02) 
 -0.171** 
(-1.96) 
141 
Bank manager’s schooling        
      (5) Less than the median  0.018 
(0.23) 
 -0.242*** 
(-3.05) 
171 
      (6) Above the median  0.065 
(0.48) 
 -0.188 
(-1.49) 
66 
Bank manager’s experience        
      (7) No previous experience as a 
            branch manager or vice-  
            manager 
-0.010 
(-0.10) 
 -0.325*** 
(-2.96) 
103 
      (8) Was a branch manager or vice  
            manager before 
0.054 
(0.60) 
 -0.229** 
(-2.52) 
129 
Bank manager’s years of residence in 
the township 
      
      (9) Less than 6 years  0.237** 
(2.24) 
 -0.104 
(-1.00) 
114 
      (10) 6 years or above  -0.136 
(-1.41) 
 -0.266*** 
(-2.86) 
121 
Notes: 
1. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. Coefficients are dF/dx.  
2. Significance level 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, **, and ***.   
3. The regressors of the regressions generating coefficients in column 1 are the same as column (3) in Table 2, but 
those generating coefficients in column 1 include only the privatization indicator, and the change of manager’s 
education and age. 
4. The number of observations may differ due to missing values of bank attributes.  The median may not equally 
divide the sample because most of the bank attributes are discrete variables. 
5. Regressions in Table 10 have more missing values than Table 9 because we use 1994 information in Table 10, 
which has more missing values than 1997 information. 
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Table A1: Sample Firm Attributes: Mean and Standard Deviation 
   1994       1997   
 TE  Privatized 
1994-97 
Private   TE  Privatized 
1994-97 
Private 
Number of observations  39  81  32    39  81  32 
             
Employment 261 
(251) 
200 
(283) 
90 
(88) 
 278 
(308) 
166 
(272) 
230 
(665) 
Sales 16.2 
(23.1) 
9.8 
(17.7) 
6.1 
(12.1) 
 26.7 
(46.7) 
14.8 
(38.0) 
21.0 
(62.8) 
Profits 0.71 
(1.9) 
0.20 
(0.7) 
0.25 
(1.0) 
 1.95 
(5.1) 
0.35 
(1.0) 
1.16 
(4.9) 
Percentage of firms with 
profit < 0 
 
14% 
 
24% 
 
20% 
  
29% 
 
30% 
 
24% 
             
Assets
1 14.4 
(19.1) 
7.9 
(10.1) 
3.8 
(5.0) 
 26.5 
(47.2) 
10.2 
(14.8) 
7.2 
(10.2) 
         Physical capital stock  5.3 
(6.4) 
2.8 
(4.4) 
1.3 
(2.3) 
 9.2 
(13.7) 
3.3 
(5.5) 
3.0 
(4.6) 
             
Debts
1 5.8 
(7.2) 
4.4 
(6.1) 
2.0 
(3.0) 
 9.0 
(12.9) 
5.6 
(8.0) 
3.1 
(4.4) 
             
Equity
1 = assets - debts  8.6 
(17.0) 
3.5 
(5.0) 
1.8 
(3.2) 
 17.5 
(39.1) 
4.6 
(7.9) 
4.1 
(6.3) 
             
Credit  Ratings             
        RCC  3.7 
(1.5) 
3.3 
(1.7) 
2.8 
(1.7) 
 3.9 
(1.5) 
3.6 
(1.6) 
3.9 
(1.7) 
         ABC  4 
(1.4) 
3.4 
(1.4) 
2.7 
(2.1) 
 3.7 
(1.5) 
3.2 
(1.4) 
3.4 
(2.0) 
             
Manger             
        Education  11.0 
(2.2) 
10.6 
(2.2) 
10.1 
(2.2) 
 11.1 
(2.3) 
10.7 
(2.2) 
10.2 
(2.3) 
        Age  43.5 
(7.1) 
43.7 
(9.0) 
40.7 
(8.4) 
 44.6 
(8.5) 
44.9 
(7.2) 
42.7 
(8.8) 
             
Notes:  
1. Assets, debts and equity have only 129 observations, because of missing observations of assets in 1994. 
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Table A2: Bank Manger’s Attributes (N=118) 
 
Specification (bank’s 1997 attributes) 
 
 
1994 
 
1997 
    
Bank manager’s bonus/fixed-wage ratio  0.62 
(0.31) 
0.77 
(0.36) 
    
Bank manager’s weight on profitability 
(1if 100 percent on profitability) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
    
Bank manager’s schooling (years)  12.0 
(2.19) 
12.6 
(1.63) 
    
Bank manager’s experience  
(1 if having been a bank manager 
before this job) 
0.43 
(0.50) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
    
Bank manager’s years of residence in 
the township 
28 
(21) 
18.2 
(19.8) 
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